There's a Whale in the Fish Tank!

While no one can put a number to the JP Morgan trading problem yet, in the vocabulary of auditors, the results likely will be material.  Using the word material in this context means that it would influence the decisions of folks relying on the financial statements.   Coming in the midst of efforts to improve both regulatory and financial controls for banks, it points out how much work remains to be done on the topic of appropriate risk management and reporting.

 It strains credibility that the bank’s CEO started to realize they had a problem when he read about the “London Whale” on the front page of the Wall Street Journal.  The trade was executed as part of what was supposed to be the bank’s risk management strategy.  If there’s a whale in your fish tank it shouldn’t take a third party to make you notice. 

While JP Morgan messed up in many ways here, you have to give them credit for keeping the conversation focused on how risky and complex the trade was.  No one can dispute that the speed and complexity of global financial transactions make them difficult to manage.  However, this focus misses the point that the bank is supposed to have internal control infrastructure that doesn’t allow them to get into a place where they make trades that have indeterminate impact.  

Anyone who has worked in a big organization knows that risk culture doesn’t change quickly in either direction.  There must be senior people at the bank today who didn’t have to read the Wall Street Journal to find out there was a problem.  Apparently the Treasurer’s position at the bank wasn’t filled during the time much of the controversial trading was going on.  However, before he left the bank, the person in the role apparently was concerned.  This is someone who was reporting the bank’s CFO.  GMI, an independent corporate ratings agency gave JP Morgan Chase an “F” for corporate governance policies in advance of the loss being made public.  This grade is typically given to less than 5% of the companies they rate.  GMI also ranked JP Morgan’s financial statements lower than 92% of comparable firms in terms of accounting and governance risk. 

Group On auditors’ found the company had a material weakness in its internal controls.  The tools are available today to highlight when controls don’t appear to be in good condition.  An error of the scale that occurred at JP Morgan Chase should not happen in an effective internal control environment.  It is hard to believe the deterioration of these controls happened suddenly since the last audit report.

Give or Take $600MM

I spent most of last week in audit training classes.  It’s no secret that the nuts and bolts of audit work are not exciting.  Unfortunately, the relevance of the task at hand was in the news.  I agree with  Lynne Turner, former head accountant at the SEC, on the missing money at MF Global.

 "It's like it just vanished into thin air and the fact that people today can't tell us where the $600 million went is not a good sign. The fact that they were held in custodial accounts that someone should have been on top of only further complicates the issue and makes it even more concerning."

Whether it was for meeting margin calls or going to a personal account in the Cayman Islands is still TBD, but that’s where the boring work that I was studying  is really important.  It may not be material for a new TV series, (CPA: Miami ??) but trained forensic accountants are the best chance for finding the needle in the haystack.

It’s important to note here that in a forensic engagement, where the task is finding the missing $600 million, the work is structured to find the needle.  However, in an audit, that level of detail work would cost too much money.  So the guys at PwC were just looking for potential misstatements that are material.  In accounting, something is material if it would cause a user of the financial statements to make a different decision about the company. 

In this case, MF Global had structured the sovereign debt deal so they could, in compliance with accounting rules, move the debt off their balance sheet.  Would investors have made a different decision if the debt were sitting in the liabilities section of the financial statements?  We’ll never know that, but FINRA regulators did find the accompanying disclosure of “off balance sheet arrangements and risk” inadequate. (My word, not theirs – I didn’t read the FINRA notice.) So with full disclosure it could have been just “caveat emptor” to investors.  You have to wonder about the judgment call to do a deal of that size and expect no one would care about the detail of a massive increase in leverage. 

Of course, the guiding light of that judgment was Jon Corzine.  One thing that’s always discussed in audit classes is how the person who is least likely to commit fraud is the one the auditors should be most worried about.   While Corzine doesn’t have the kind of financial motivation that say a bookkeeper has, clearly he sanctioned decisions that can only be described as rationalizing illegal behavior.  The fraud triangle is motivation, rationalization and opportunity.  Corzine had all three.  Who knows, this could be material for the first episode of CPA & Order….